Think-Tanks'Press

Tensions between France and Italy soared in July following the French government’s decision to nationalise shipbuilder Stx/Chantier de l’Atlantique rather than give Italy’s Fincantieri a majority stake, thus reneging on an agreement between Italy and France’s previous government. Diplomatic relations had already been tested earlier that week when President Macron organised a peace conference on Libya without inviting the Italian government that considers itself a key player on the Libyan dossier. The two events, which are unrelated, created a perfect storm among Italians, resulting in some public spats and a queue of French ministers flying to Rome to patch up relations.

Current Franco-Italian disagreements recall the events of 2011, when France and the United Kingdom took the lead in a military intervention in Libya. The Italian government at the time was hampered by political troubles at home was unable to fulfil what could have been a “natural” mediating role for Italy.

The same year as the Libya intervention, French investment in Italy also contributed to the perception of a French conquest of the peninsula.

Contemporary tensions reopened old wounds among Italians who see the French state as protectionist and nationalist, recalling the 2006 attempt of Italian state-controlled energy company ENEL to take over the French-based utility company Suez. The attempt was blocked by the French government, which instead created the state controlled GDF-Suez group in order to keep the company in French hands.

Deportation costs: In April of this year, Immigration and Customs Enforcement reported that the average cost of a deportation, also referred to as a removal, was $10,854 in FY 2016, including apprehension, detention, and processing.

Based on the description provided by ICE, the estimated removal costs do not include expenditures for the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), which is part of the Department of Justice. Though it has a few other responsibilities, the overwhelming share of EOIR’s workload is for removals. In FY 2016, EOIR’s budget was $420.3 million and there were 240,255 removals in that year, which would mean that EOIR’s cost per removal was $1,749.

Costs of illegal immigrants: There is a total lifetime fiscal drain of $746.3 billion. This assumes 11.43 million illegal immigrants are in the country based on the U.S. government’s most recent estimate.

The above cost estimates are only for the original illegal immigrant, and exclude descendants. Using the National Academy of Sciences net cost estimates for the descendants adds $16,998 to the net fiscal drain.

During the second term of the Obama administration, policies prohibiting agents from arresting aliens became increasingly stringent. A recent Government Accountability Office report found that the backlog of pending cases that are carried over from the prior year in immigration court more than doubled between 2006 and 2015.

The Trump administration has curtailed some of these policies. Moreover, the number of arrests by ICE has increased substantially in the first few months of the new administration even though the administration has yet to implement the president’s directive to increase the Enforcement and Removal Operations agent corps.

A significant number of Canadians—an estimated 63,459 people—may have received treatment outside of the country in 2016. This is a significant increase from the 45,619 who were estimated to have travelled abroad in 2015 and also higher than the 52,513 who were estimated to have travelled abroad in 2014.

Increases between 2015 and 2016 in the estimated number of patients going outside Canada for treatment were seen in seven provinces: British Columbia (10,315 to 15,372), Alberta (4,616 to 9,067), Ontario (22,352 to 26,513), Manitoba (702 to 2,052), Quebec (3,360 to 4,603), Saskatchewan (from 712 to 1,888), and Nova Scotia (1,466 to 2,438).

Some patients may have been sent out of country by the public health care system due to a lack of available resources or the fact that some procedures or equipment are not provided in their home jurisdiction. Others may have chosen to leave Canada in response to concerns about quality, seeking more advanced health care facilities, more state-of-the-art medical technologies, or better outcomes.

Another explanation may relate to the long waiting times that patients are forced endure in Canada’s health care system. For example, in 2016, patients could expect to wait 10.6 weeks for medically necessary treatment after seeing a specialist.

The EU has decided to fully integrate Moldova into its single energy market. According to laws passed in the last year, Chisinau must comply with the norms set out in the Third Energy Package by 2020. These norms provide for splitting gas sales and transportation, which will most probably force Gazprom out of Moldova’s gas transport system.

The Democratic Party of Moldova, which holds a majority in parliament, is fully pro-Western. Because of the current confrontation with Russia, it is important for the United States and, to some extent, the EU to ensure that parliament remains oriented toward the West even though it sees Moldova as a “captured state” in which power is concentrated in the hands of the oligarch and Democratic Party leader Vlad Plahotniuc. Without a parliamentary majority, Igor Dodon will have limited options unless he works with the Democratic Party.

The history of Russian-Moldovan negotiations in the framework of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation suggests that a so-called “integration of integrations” is the way forward: Moscow is now hoping to find a way to let Moldova enjoy free trade agreements with both the EU and the EAEU.

The Tasmanian government has correctly identified rising electricity prices as a significant political problem, but failed to provide a long-term solution. With a state election expected early next year, the recent state budget sets aside more than $100 million to subsidize electricity prices for the next year. $70 million of this is forgone revenue to government from the publicly-owned Hydro Tasmania, flowing from the decision to cap electricity price increases at 2% for 12 months.

At the same time Tasmania has substantial hydroelectric generation capacity and excellent wind and solar resources. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has said that he wants to see Tasmania become a ‘battery for Australia’.

Rather than spending more than $100 million to reduce electricity bills in the short term, this paper proposes to invest in building new, distributed solar and wind generation which will make Tasmania self-reliant and reduce bills over the long-term.

In a carbon constrained world that is transitioning to renewable, Tasmanian consumers and businesses should be enjoying significantly lower power prices and higher than average energy security.

Tasmania’s reliant on the NEM (National Electricity Market) means that its supply and pricing is tied to ageing coal fired power stations, a lack of investment due to policy uncertainty and trading rules more favorable to inflexible coal power. It is not taking advantage of its responsive hydroelectricity assets and cost effective generation technologies like wind and solar.

This paper proposes a long-term energy strategy for the state, where Tasmania is again self-reliant through integrated hydro, wind and solar generation.

The commander of Operation Dignity, Khalifa Haftar, shocked supporters even more than his opponents when he agreed to meet the Chairman of the Presidential Council, Fayez al-Sarraj, in Abu Dhabi on 2 May 2017, having previously refused to recognise him. This about-face may come as a result of acquiescence to direct international pressure by Haftar’s regional allies.

It is clear that Haftar’s acceptance of consensual agreement and reconciliation comes from a realisation that military action is unlikely to deliver control of the country. From his standpoint, it therefore makes sense to attempt to impose his conditions through negotiations, which means the Skhirat agreement could collapse or undergo the radical revisions that Haftar’s allies in the east are pressing for and which were previously raised by Ahmed Mismari, the official spokesman for the Libyan National Army.

If Haftar is compelled to opt for a negotiated resolution, obstacles remain. There is vociferous opposition to Haftar’s inclusion in the political process and the way he has exploited the tattered political, security and economic situation to cling to power. Al-Sarraj’s capitulation to Haftar’s terms could also stoke the anger present in several areas of Libya and increase tensions in Tripoli, potentially precipitating open clashes.

Moreover, the precarious situation and Haftar’s focus on the capital at the expense of settling conflicts in the eastern region, which has suffered enormously in the past three years, could spur his opponents in the east to mobilise against him on the basis of local and tribal loyalties, exploiting the shift in his position on the accord. It is under the general banner of his opposition to the accord that Haftar has created his own front, and any backtracking could lead to fractures within it.

These obstacles suggest other possible motives for Haftar’s abandonment of his previous stance on the Skhirat agreement and the Presidential Council. He could be feigning acceptance of the agreement to gain some breathing room and evade regional and international pressure, in which case he will return to his militant positions and a reliance on military force as soon as the opportunity presents itself and the pressure is lifted. Or Haftar could be gambling on a truce to pave the way for presidential elections, calculating that his chances of election are good. In this way, he would achieve his goal through peaceful means that meet with local support and foreign backing.