Think-Tanks'Press

Growing discontent threatens the dysfunctional and corrupt political system built by President Museveni, who is now manoeuvring to extend his three decades in power by raising a 75-year age limit on presidential candidates. As security, governance and economic performance deteriorates, Uganda needs urgent reforms to avoid greater instability.

The combination of corrupt, politicised police plus rising unemployment and deteriorating local governance, has contributed to mounting crime. In Kampala, youth gangs at times allegedly connive with police officials. Between May and August 2017 at least twenty women were raped and murdered on the outskirts of Kampala and Entebbe, sparking public panic.

Major violence is unlikely for now, but Uganda nonetheless faces the gradual fraying of order, security and governance. Discontent is growing, particularly among youth, against what many Ugandans see as perpetual rule by President Museveni and his NRM government. The president cannot continue to rely on patronage and coercion by loyal security services instead of initiating the reforms necessary to reverse the decline of the economy, public services and security. 

Despite the fact that more than 60 years have passed since the death of Joseph Stalin, the leader of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics from 1922 to 1953, the memory of him remains alive. For several years running Stalin has topped the ranking of the most remarkable figures in Russia’s history. Portraits of him appear at political demonstrations and religious events; new monuments to the dictator are erected.

However, Stalin’s popularity among society in today’s Russia is rather superficial—Russians know little about the dictator and his life; they are rather nostalgic about the period of Stalin’s rule and the achievements of his era. Any criticism of him (from Russian citizens and civil society organisations as well as the international community) is seen as an attack on contemporary Russia and its present government which presents itself as the heir to the USSR’s and Stalin’s accomplishments and victories.

The main instruments which the Russian government uses to promote its vision of history are propaganda and the education system. The state-owned media circulate materials which portray Stalin above all as the architect of the victory in the Great Patriotic War.

It should not be expected that the government will pursue a policy of de-Stalinisation at its own initiative in the immediate future – the fact that it uses a selectively developed vision of history brings too many advantages both internally and in the international arena. In a way the Kremlin has become hostage to its own politics of memory.

LEFT BEHIND?

The Balkan countries have set upon their quest for integration ever since the late ‘90s. During their lasting interaction, the partners have engaged in an often-inconsistent negotiation framework that moved from the idea of “sharing everything but institutions” to a more cautious approach, dominated by (im)patience and mutual demands that did not generate any tangible outcome.

The (Balkan) bride was – from time to time – convinced of the (European) groom’s serious intentions, while never committing to anyone, but to the states on the Balkan “rim”.

The European Union simply cannot afford to take the Balkans for granted anymore. Since 2000 and the initial enthusiasm, the Balkans have changed and the European Union has changed. The entire world has changed and new radical processes are developing. The “end of history” is over.

And the “geopolitical romance” cannot continue on the same basis, as if nothing had happened in the meanwhile.