The Haftar-Sarraj Rapprochement and Prospects for a Resolution of the Libyan Crisis

The commander of Operation Dignity, Khalifa Haftar, shocked supporters even more than his opponents when he agreed to meet the Chairman of the Presidential Council, Fayez al-Sarraj, in Abu Dhabi on 2 May 2017, having previously refused to recognise him. This about-face may come as a result of acquiescence to direct international pressure by Haftar’s regional allies.

It is clear that Haftar’s acceptance of consensual agreement and reconciliation comes from a realisation that military action is unlikely to deliver control of the country. From his standpoint, it therefore makes sense to attempt to impose his conditions through negotiations, which means the Skhirat agreement could collapse or undergo the radical revisions that Haftar’s allies in the east are pressing for and which were previously raised by Ahmed Mismari, the official spokesman for the Libyan National Army.

If Haftar is compelled to opt for a negotiated resolution, obstacles remain. There is vociferous opposition to Haftar’s inclusion in the political process and the way he has exploited the tattered political, security and economic situation to cling to power. Al-Sarraj’s capitulation to Haftar’s terms could also stoke the anger present in several areas of Libya and increase tensions in Tripoli, potentially precipitating open clashes.

Moreover, the precarious situation and Haftar’s focus on the capital at the expense of settling conflicts in the eastern region, which has suffered enormously in the past three years, could spur his opponents in the east to mobilise against him on the basis of local and tribal loyalties, exploiting the shift in his position on the accord. It is under the general banner of his opposition to the accord that Haftar has created his own front, and any backtracking could lead to fractures within it.

These obstacles suggest other possible motives for Haftar’s abandonment of his previous stance on the Skhirat agreement and the Presidential Council. He could be feigning acceptance of the agreement to gain some breathing room and evade regional and international pressure, in which case he will return to his militant positions and a reliance on military force as soon as the opportunity presents itself and the pressure is lifted. Or Haftar could be gambling on a truce to pave the way for presidential elections, calculating that his chances of election are good. In this way, he would achieve his goal through peaceful means that meet with local support and foreign backing.

[ > Al Jazeera Centre for Studies – May 25, 2017 ]

CHINA’S TWO OCEAN STRATEGY

Federalism in Syria, PYD and Ambivalent Position of Iran

The ambivalent position of Iran has led two different, and contrasting assessments. First assessment suggests that Iran is in partnership with PKK with regard to regional issues for a while. Accordingly, having assisted by PUK that has been long time friend of Tehran, Iran brokered an agreement between PYD, the Syrian branch of PKK and the Assad administration. Accordingly, Assad surrendered the north of Syria to PYD in return for its promise to avoid joining the Syrian opposition,and to suppress anti-regime protests in the region. As stated by Nuri Brimo, a member of Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS), ‘PYD turned into gendarmerie of Assad and Iran’. That is, the declaration of autonomous or federal region by PYD is not beyond information and control of Iran. Moreover, the Assad administration and Iran have supported PYD both as part of their strategy to struggle against extremist ‘takfiri movements,’ and to prevent Turkey from mounting influence in the region.

Additionally, there is an apparent sympathy in Iranian media towards the Syrian Kurds, especially PYD. One of the reasons for that sympathy is the emergence of PYD as an ‘efficient’ actor that has been fighting against ‘takfiri terrorists’.  Second, a sense of consolidation with the Kurdsas part of ‘Irani’ peoples is prevalent in Iranian media, which boosted by ‘neo-Aryanist’ feelings. Additionally some people are advocates of building close relations with Kurdish movements in the region, for strategic reasons, in order to assure Kurdish support in future. Hence, relations between Iran and PYD/PKK are not only forced by contextual developments, but also shaped by strategic calculations.

[ > Center for Middle Eastern Strategic Studies – April 2017 ]

The European Union Trust Fund for Africa

CHINA-PAKISTAN CYBER COLLUSION

Post the strikes of September 2016, a number of Pakistani hacker groups had attacked and defaced Indian websites. Times of India put the figure at over 7000. The damage or disruption however, was minor as the websites were academic, State Government, or institutional and penetration limited. What was however of concern was the attack on BSNL and MTNL networks which carry most of India’s official traffic. The potential of manipulation and disruption and damage is thus, considerable. This is further compounded by the fact that a very large proportion of the hardware is of Chinese origin, with the possibility of trap doors and other vulnerabilities.

India issued a Cyber Security Policy in 2013 and a Cyber Security Coordination Officer has been appointed at the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS). The much awaited National Cyber Security Coordination Center (NCSCC) is yet to be set up. A number of organizations such as Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), NIC, NASSCOM, Data Security Council of India (DSCI) are working with respect to cyber security and there is some coordination. However given the challenges, number of agencies involved, tendency to work in silos and lack of trust, the field is open for mischief. In addition are inadequate staff and poor manning standards. In this fast changing domain, India lags far behind. The question simply is: ‘Has a Cyber 26/11 been planned for?’

A ‘Framework for the US-India Cyber Relationship’ was signed on 30 August 2016. While terror is not specifically mentioned, the text covers protection of critical infrastructure and measures for national security. A similar agreement was signed with Russia during the BRICS Summit in October 2016. Though the document is not public, it allows government agencies to work together on counter terrorism. Terror is a universal concern. Cooperation with like-minded countries specially, those which are threatened must become a priority. Expertise of countries such as Israel can be sought for the Indian scenario. It may also be advisable to reach out to nations like Taiwan, who have not only been targeted, but also understand the Han psychology. International cooperation also generates confidence building and deterrence value, as also consensus for global norms and conventions to protect non-combatants and citizen services.

[ > Delhi Policy Group – March 1, 2017 ]

Belgrade’s EEU plans