Think-Tanks'Press

Numerous new branches of cooperation are being activated, such as interaction between regions, interaction in the field of international information security, tourism, energy, etc. Particular attention is paid to strengthening the role of BRICS in the context of interaction at the level of major international organizations (United Nations and World Trade Organization) and platforms (G20).

The meeting of BRICS Ministers of Industry on July 29, 2017, in Hangzhou ended in signing the Action Plan to deepen industrial cooperation between the states of the association.

The most important innovation in the development of BRICS is, of course, China’s idea to include extra-regional players in the dialogue in the «BRICS+» and «BRICS++» format.

In 2017, Mexico was invited to the BRICS summit as a representative of Latin American region, Guinea would represent the African Union, Egypt would represent North Africa, Tajikistan became the representative of the Eurasian space, and Thailand — of South-East Asia.

It should be recognized that, given the economic situation — like the slowdown in economic growth in many BRICS countries and even its downturns, as well as political factors such as deteriorating situation in Brazil and South Africa, the growing tension between Russia and the leading Western countries, BRICS is being seriously challenged.

There is certain tension among BRICS countries, especially between China and India, which, of course, puts the unity of BRICS to test. Certain contradictions between Russia and India are associated with the support of Pakistan and a number of issues in the area of military and technical cooperation.

The interests of resource producing countries and consumer countries also rarely coincide. In this regard, there is a number of contradictions with both Brazil and South Africa.

Mikheil Saakashvili, the former president of Georgia and ex-head of the Odesa Regional State Administration, returned to Ukraine on 10 September at a border crossing with Poland. He had been stripped of his Ukrainian citizenship at the end of July by Ukraine President Petro Poroshenko, supposedly for concealing in 2015 from the Ukrainian migration service that he had been under investigation in Georgia.

Saakashvili returned to Ukraine for political reasons—he wants to challenge Poroshenko’s decision in court and build his own political platform under the banners of de-oligarchisation and fighting corruption. A key role in the political attempt will be played by the Movement of New Forces, a party established by Saakashvili in late 2016.

Saakashvili’s presence changes the political balance in Ukraine. It may exacerbate the conflict between, on one side, Poroshenko, for whom the return of a political opponent is a personal defeat, and Yulia Tymoshenko and Andriy Sadovyi on the other. Both Tymoshenko and Sadovyi helped Saakashvili cross the Ukraine border, seeing it as an opportunity to weaken Poroshenko. Since Tymoshenko is likely to be the main opposition candidate in the next presidential election and has a high level of electoral support (10–12%), Poroshenko may be forced to take some actions to discredit the Batkivschyna party leader anyway. Helping Saakashvili therefore will only be a formal pretext to exert pressure on Tymoshenko and her faction.

After years of economic mismanagement and political strife, Venezuela finds itself in the midst of a political, economic, and humanitarian crisis, due in part to an unsustainable loans-for-oil debtor relationship with China.

The heyday of Chavez’s political dominance during the first decade of the 2000s coincided with Beijing’s dramatic upscaling of its commercial and diplomatic relationship with Caracas.

Over the past decade, China has become Venezuela’s key overseas financial lifeline, providing the oil-dependent economy with over $60 billion in oil-backed loans and tens of billions more in other contracts and investment deals.

Ultimately, Venezuela is faced with the choice of defaulting on its loan and oil shipment agreements or further curtailing government spending on domestic social and humanitarian programs in order to service its debts to China and other creditors.

China may view the chaotic status quo in Venezuela as a safer bet for having its loans repaid and ensuring future oil shipments—not to mention preserving its close state-to-state ties—than a transition to a different, possibly opposition-led government.