Think-Tanks'Press

The EU has decided to fully integrate Moldova into its single energy market. According to laws passed in the last year, Chisinau must comply with the norms set out in the Third Energy Package by 2020. These norms provide for splitting gas sales and transportation, which will most probably force Gazprom out of Moldova’s gas transport system.

The Democratic Party of Moldova, which holds a majority in parliament, is fully pro-Western. Because of the current confrontation with Russia, it is important for the United States and, to some extent, the EU to ensure that parliament remains oriented toward the West even though it sees Moldova as a “captured state” in which power is concentrated in the hands of the oligarch and Democratic Party leader Vlad Plahotniuc. Without a parliamentary majority, Igor Dodon will have limited options unless he works with the Democratic Party.

The history of Russian-Moldovan negotiations in the framework of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation suggests that a so-called “integration of integrations” is the way forward: Moscow is now hoping to find a way to let Moldova enjoy free trade agreements with both the EU and the EAEU.

The Tasmanian government has correctly identified rising electricity prices as a significant political problem, but failed to provide a long-term solution. With a state election expected early next year, the recent state budget sets aside more than $100 million to subsidize electricity prices for the next year. $70 million of this is forgone revenue to government from the publicly-owned Hydro Tasmania, flowing from the decision to cap electricity price increases at 2% for 12 months.

At the same time Tasmania has substantial hydroelectric generation capacity and excellent wind and solar resources. Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has said that he wants to see Tasmania become a ‘battery for Australia’.

Rather than spending more than $100 million to reduce electricity bills in the short term, this paper proposes to invest in building new, distributed solar and wind generation which will make Tasmania self-reliant and reduce bills over the long-term.

In a carbon constrained world that is transitioning to renewable, Tasmanian consumers and businesses should be enjoying significantly lower power prices and higher than average energy security.

Tasmania’s reliant on the NEM (National Electricity Market) means that its supply and pricing is tied to ageing coal fired power stations, a lack of investment due to policy uncertainty and trading rules more favorable to inflexible coal power. It is not taking advantage of its responsive hydroelectricity assets and cost effective generation technologies like wind and solar.

This paper proposes a long-term energy strategy for the state, where Tasmania is again self-reliant through integrated hydro, wind and solar generation.

The commander of Operation Dignity, Khalifa Haftar, shocked supporters even more than his opponents when he agreed to meet the Chairman of the Presidential Council, Fayez al-Sarraj, in Abu Dhabi on 2 May 2017, having previously refused to recognise him. This about-face may come as a result of acquiescence to direct international pressure by Haftar’s regional allies.

It is clear that Haftar’s acceptance of consensual agreement and reconciliation comes from a realisation that military action is unlikely to deliver control of the country. From his standpoint, it therefore makes sense to attempt to impose his conditions through negotiations, which means the Skhirat agreement could collapse or undergo the radical revisions that Haftar’s allies in the east are pressing for and which were previously raised by Ahmed Mismari, the official spokesman for the Libyan National Army.

If Haftar is compelled to opt for a negotiated resolution, obstacles remain. There is vociferous opposition to Haftar’s inclusion in the political process and the way he has exploited the tattered political, security and economic situation to cling to power. Al-Sarraj’s capitulation to Haftar’s terms could also stoke the anger present in several areas of Libya and increase tensions in Tripoli, potentially precipitating open clashes.

Moreover, the precarious situation and Haftar’s focus on the capital at the expense of settling conflicts in the eastern region, which has suffered enormously in the past three years, could spur his opponents in the east to mobilise against him on the basis of local and tribal loyalties, exploiting the shift in his position on the accord. It is under the general banner of his opposition to the accord that Haftar has created his own front, and any backtracking could lead to fractures within it.

These obstacles suggest other possible motives for Haftar’s abandonment of his previous stance on the Skhirat agreement and the Presidential Council. He could be feigning acceptance of the agreement to gain some breathing room and evade regional and international pressure, in which case he will return to his militant positions and a reliance on military force as soon as the opportunity presents itself and the pressure is lifted. Or Haftar could be gambling on a truce to pave the way for presidential elections, calculating that his chances of election are good. In this way, he would achieve his goal through peaceful means that meet with local support and foreign backing.

The economic necessity of reforming the PLAN so as to eventually protect China’s SLOCs (sea lines of communications) was evident, and the military necessity also became increasingly obvious as demonstrated by two events.

In 1988, scrimmages between China and Vietnam over the Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands highlighted the need for a navy capable of operating and fighting in the seas adjacent to China.

In 1991, the decisive and swift victory of the United States in the First Gulf War shook the Chinese military community – policy-makers and academics alike –: it not only accentuated the difference in military capabilities between China and the US, but also gave impetus to the speed of military reform in China.

It is likewise important to note that, currently, the People’s Liberation Army Navy is in the second phase according to Liu’s plan. Moreover, it is evident that the PLAN’s modernization has been merged with the OBOR (“One Belt, One Road” Initiative), so that the goals of the two projects can mutually benefit one another.

The ambivalent position of Iran has led two different, and contrasting assessments. First assessment suggests that Iran is in partnership with PKK with regard to regional issues for a while. Accordingly, having assisted by PUK that has been long time friend of Tehran, Iran brokered an agreement between PYD, the Syrian branch of PKK and the Assad administration. Accordingly, Assad surrendered the north of Syria to PYD in return for its promise to avoid joining the Syrian opposition,and to suppress anti-regime protests in the region. As stated by Nuri Brimo, a member of Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS), ‘PYD turned into gendarmerie of Assad and Iran’. That is, the declaration of autonomous or federal region by PYD is not beyond information and control of Iran. Moreover, the Assad administration and Iran have supported PYD both as part of their strategy to struggle against extremist ‘takfiri movements,’ and to prevent Turkey from mounting influence in the region.

Additionally, there is an apparent sympathy in Iranian media towards the Syrian Kurds, especially PYD. One of the reasons for that sympathy is the emergence of PYD as an ‘efficient’ actor that has been fighting against ‘takfiri terrorists’.  Second, a sense of consolidation with the Kurdsas part of ‘Irani’ peoples is prevalent in Iranian media, which boosted by ‘neo-Aryanist’ feelings. Additionally some people are advocates of building close relations with Kurdish movements in the region, for strategic reasons, in order to assure Kurdish support in future. Hence, relations between Iran and PYD/PKK are not only forced by contextual developments, but also shaped by strategic calculations.

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) is a central part of the EU’s engagement on migration.

It has generated both high aspirations and serious concerns regarding its aims, activities, and relationship to broader trends in migration and development policy.

The EUTF’s stated goal is to “address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration”, an aim that is widely seen as unrealistic.

However, key actors have other ambitions for the fund. These include demonstrating action on migration in response to political pressure, incentivising African cooperation on migration management, and using the fund’s flexibility to develop innovative programming.